The notion that Europe is shifting to the right, with nationalist and far-right parties gaining ground, is no longer merely an observation repeated only during election campaigns. From Germany to France, and from the Netherlands to Austria, we are seeing concrete electoral results reflecting this trend in many countries. The rise of the AfD in Germany is one of the most visible examples of this trend. However, the results from Berlin appear, at first glance, to present a contradiction: Whilst the right is gaining ground in many regions of Germany, in the country’s capital Die Linke came first, and Elif Eralp – the daughter of a family that migrated from Turkey to Germany for political reasons – has emerged as one of the strongest candidates for the city’s administration. Whilst Die Linke came first in Berlin with 25.7 per cent, the AfD also reached 16.3 per cent; in other words, the election demonstrated not only the rise of the left but also the fragmentation of the traditional political centre.
It is easy, but insufficient, to explain this picture simply by saying ‘Berlin is left-wing’. For the changes taking place in Berlin bear the hallmarks of a deeper political polarisation emerging in capitalist societies today. The same economic and social crisis, the same cost of living, the same sense of a lack of future prospects and the same problem of political representation can drive people towards the radical right in one place and towards the left in another. Consequently, the fundamental question facing us is not merely why people are becoming radicalised, but under what conditions they are radicalising and in which direction.
The Berlin election is instructive in this respect. One of the issues most frequently raised by voters was that of housing and rent. Surveys showed that 53 per cent of Berliners identified the housing market and rents as one of the most important political issues. Die Linke has also become the party in which voters place the greatest trust when it comes to finding solutions in this area. The issue here was not an abstract debate about socialism. There was a problem that directly affected people’s everyday lives: How will I pay the rent? Will I be able to continue living in this city? Will my child be able to find a home here? Why is the cost of housing constantly rising when my income isn’t increasing?
Major political transformations sometimes arise precisely from such seemingly ordinary questions. Because rent is not just rent. It determines how much of your wages you keep, which neighbourhood you can live in, how far you have to travel to work, which school your children will attend, whether you can start a family, and ultimately, whether you can stay in the city. In other words, the housing problem is increasingly becoming a class issue in the modern metropolis.
In the political conflicts of classical industrial capitalism, the factory occupied a central position. The production floor was where the relationship between worker and capital owner was most visible. It would be wrong to think that this relationship has disappeared in today’s major cities; however, the areas where exploitation and inequality are felt have multiplied. The wage earner navigates life not only through workplace relationships but also as a tenant facing a landlord, a consumer facing an energy company, a debtor facing a bank, and a passenger facing the transport system. When a significant portion of a pay rise is eroded by a rent increase, the housing market can become another arena for the struggle over wages.
For this reason, the policy pursued by Die Linke in Berlin regarding large housing companies and high rents should not be viewed merely as an ideological discourse. It provides a political explanation for a material contradiction within the city. The AfD, on the other hand, attributes a significant portion of economic and social insecurity to migration, borders, security and national identity. The same person’s experience of the high cost of living can be attributed to two different causes by two distinct political narratives. In one, the problem is sought in the distribution of wealth and property; in the other, migration and cultural change are emphasised.
This distinction also shows why the phrase ‘the public is becoming more right-wing’, which has been used frequently in recent years, is inadequate. The public is not a homogeneous whole. The economic reality experienced by a young healthcare worker living in rented accommodation in Berlin is not the same as that experienced by a fifty-year-old worker in a small, depopulating town in eastern Germany. Both may be anxious about the future, both may believe that the current system does not protect them, and both may be drifting away from the traditional parties; yet the political language into which this dissatisfaction is channelled need not be the same.
It is precisely for this reason that it is not surprising that very different election results can emerge almost simultaneously across Germany. Whilst Die Linke came first in Berlin, the AfD achieved a very strong result in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, demonstrating that distinct social landscapes exist even within a single Germany. In this context, viewing the political map solely through the prism of ‘right’ and ‘left’ colours is insufficient to understand the issue. We must also recognise the differences between the metropolis and the periphery, growing cities and shrinking towns, tenants and property owners, the young and the old, those with security and those without, and those who benefit from the global economy and those who feel left out of it.
Another aspect that makes Berlin interesting is that this development is not unique to Germany. On the other side of the Atlantic, in New York, Zohran Mamdani took office as mayor at the start of 2026. The campaign of Mamdani, who describes himself as a democratic socialist, also centred on everyday economic issues such as the cost of living, rent, public transport and childcare. This similarity does not mean that Berlin and New York share the same political structure. The party systems of the United States and Germany are very different. Nor do Mamdani and Die Linke share the same historical and organisational traditions. Nevertheless, it is striking to note the issues around which politics in both cities has centred.
In Washington, Janeese Lewis George’s victory in the 2026 Democratic Party mayoral primary has further fuelled this debate. Lewis George has not yet been elected mayor in the general election; however, her campaign – backed by the Democratic Socialists – centred once again on the cost of living, workers’ rights, childcare and housing. Similarly, in the US, Seattle Mayor Katie Wilson is also a figure linked to the democratic socialist movement. The American press is debating whether these developments in New York, Washington and Seattle signal a new wave of left-wing politics emerging in major cities. However, it cannot yet be said that this is a homogeneous movement that has spread across the entire country.
In Europe, meanwhile, the Austrian city of Graz has long stood as a distinct example. The mayoralty of Elke Kahr, a member of the KPÖ, is rooted in a local political tradition shaped particularly by housing and social welfare policies. When we consider these examples side by side, we cannot say that there is a single organisational centre or a shared ideological programme linking Berlin, New York, Washington, Seattle and Graz. Indeed, such a claim would oversimplify the reality. However, it is worth reflecting on how similar social problems in these independent cities are giving rise to similar political demands.
In my view, this is where the key point to note emerges: perhaps the fundamental political movement of our era is not merely the ‘rise of the right’. It is also the erosion of the centre that has long underpinned politics in Europe and North America. A significant proportion of the population believes that traditional centre-right and centre-left parties are unable to provide answers to current problems. Which political force will fill this void, however, depends on social and local conditions.
From this perspective, the rise of the radical right and the emergence of the new urban left may not be entirely independent processes. Both may be fuelled by dissatisfaction with the existing order; however, they interpret this dissatisfaction in entirely different ways. Whilst a significant proportion of right-wing populist movements attribute the cause of their losses to outsiders, immigration, globalisation, liberal cultural change or the political elite; left-wing movements focus on economic inequality, wage suppression, the commodification of housing, the erosion of public services and the concentration of wealth. The political struggle arises precisely at this point: namely, over which cause to attribute the real hardships people are experiencing.
The hardships people face are not imaginary. Rising rents are a reality. Wages eroding in the face of the cost of living is a reality. Uncertainty about the future is a reality. The inadequacy of public services is a reality. The loss experienced by deindustrialised regions is also a reality. However, the fact that a material problem is real does not mean that its political explanation will automatically point in a single direction. This is precisely where the power of politics lies: in attributing different causes, identifying different parties responsible, and proposing different solutions to the same social reality.
For this reason, the result in Berlin does not indicate that the AfD’s rise in Germany has come to an end. On the contrary, the AfD also secured a significant share of the vote in the Berlin election. Similarly, Mamdani’s victory in New York does not mean that the United States is shifting to the left. The success of democratic socialists in a few major cities is not proof that capitalism has entered a new socialist era. It would be premature to draw such general conclusions from these results.
However, viewing these developments as insignificant local exceptions could also lead to another misconception. This is because major cities are becoming the areas where the contradictions of capitalism are felt most acutely. Whilst capital, property, finance, technology and high incomes are concentrating in these very cities, the millions of wage earners who keep these cities running are facing an increasingly heavy burden of housing and living costs. The fact that, as a city grows economically richer, the people living there feel increasingly impoverished is one of the key contradictions of contemporary capitalism.
If a nurse, teacher, waiter, courier, cleaner or young academic can no longer afford to live in the centre of the city where they work, this is not merely a housing issue. It is a matter of the very people who sustain the city’s production and daily life being pushed out of the city. For this reason, the concept of the ‘right to the city’ is regaining political significance. Who will be able to live in this city? Who will decide? Is the city a commodity to be invested in, or is it a shared living space for its inhabitants? Is housing an investment vehicle, or a basic necessity?
The return of these questions to the political arena may also signify the return of the class issue in a different form. For class is not merely a matter of one’s position in the factory. How income is earned as well as how it is spent, one’s position within property relations, and who bears the cost of economic crises are all part of class relations.
However, there is no automatic formula for success from a left-wing perspective either. It is not possible to generalise election results achieved in major cities to the whole of society. A narrative that is effective in city centres may not resonate in the same way in a deindustrialised region or a rural area experiencing population decline. If left-wing politics is viewed solely as the politics of the educated, young and metropolitan population, it risks ceding a section of the broader working class to right-wing populism. Similarly, explaining the rise of the right solely in terms of ‘ignorance’, ‘racism’ or cultural reactionary tendencies may render the economic and social foundations invisible.
Perhaps the question that needs to be asked anew today is this: What are people angry about?
Without an answer to this question, election results remain nothing more than percentages.
If a worker fears losing their job, if a young person believes they will never be able to own a home in their lifetime, if a pensioner struggles to pay their rent, if someone living in a small town sees their hospital, railway line or school close down, or if a migrant worker, despite doing the same job, cannot feel like an equal member of society, then there is a problem that appears different in each case but converges on a common ground: a significant proportion of people feel they have lost control over their lives.
Who will politicise this feeling has become one of the fundamental struggles of our age.
On the one hand, there is a political narrative that says, ‘Your lives are getting worse because the borders are open, immigration is too high, and the elites running your country have forgotten you’. On the other hand, another narrative is emerging which states: ‘Your lives are getting worse because income and wealth are being distributed ever more unequally, housing and basic needs are left to the mercy of the market, and workers’ economic power is waning.’
This is precisely where Berlin’s significance may lie.
Berlin is not telling us that Europe has now turned to the left.
New York does not tell us that America has become socialist.
Nor does the rise of the AfD prove that the entire working class has shifted to the right.
Together, these developments point to something more complex: the old political centre is no longer able to hold people together as it once did.
And as the centre weakens, the anger building up beneath society flows in different directions.
In one place, it turns into anger directed at migrants; in another, against large property companies.
In one place, it takes the form of demands for borders; in another, demands for rent caps.
In one place, it becomes a call to protect national identity; in another, a debate over public ownership.
For this reason, the question ‘Is the right on the rise, or the left?’ may not, on its own, be sufficient to understand the period ahead. The more important question is this:
In this new era of insecurity created by capitalism, into what political language will people’s anger be translated?
The Berlin elections do not yet provide the answer to this question.
But they are a strong indication that the question can no longer be postponed.
